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Abstract 
 Depression is associated with decisions to withdraw from ones environment, and to 
avoid potentially rewarding situations. Currently, little research has examined the decision-
making styles of depressed individuals. We investigated the relationships among depressive 
symptoms, decision-making styles, induced mood and the impact that each has on risk-aversion 
in hypothetical decisions made for the self and an unknown “other”. Two hundred and forty 
undergraduates completed a survey packet which included our various depression and decision 
making measures. Results revealed that a positive interaction between the regret based style and 
symptom level was the only predictor of risk-averse choices made for the self (p=.017), and the 
analytical style was the only predictor of risk averse choices made for others (p=.009). 
Additional findings showed participants to be more risk averse for others than for themselves in 
higher risk situations, but more risk-seeking for others in low risk situations. Implications and 
future directions are discussed.  
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Relating Decision Making Styles, Depressive Symptoms, and Induced Mood to Risk 
Aversion 
 When most individuals are about to make an important decision, they first spend some 
time thinking about the options involved. Yet different people might weigh certain thoughts 
more heavily than others.  For example, when deciding between two job offers, one person, 
Ashley, may look up as much information as she can find, and compare the pros and cons of 
each job, in a highly analytical fashion. Another person, Ian,  might simply have a certain gut-
feeling about one job that he does not have about the other, and would therefore go with the job 
that he intuitively knew was best for him. Even still, a third person, Rita, might ask herself 
which she would be least likely to feel bad about choosing later on. She would come to her final 
decision based on the idea that the job she chooses is less likely to cause her to regret her 
decision in the long run. Whether individuals invoke an analytical, intuitive, regret-based, or 
even combined decision-making style is not necessarily indicative of which option they will 
choose in any given situation. However, the decision-making styles that people use do clue us in 
to the type of information that is most salient to different kinds of decision makers.  
 Although research in the field of judgment and decision making has not been able to 
definitively claim one way of making decisions is best, past research has shown that decision 
making style is a relatively stable characteristic, even when the same person makes two very 
different decisions in a short period of time (Nygren, 2000). By examining the ways different 
personality traits (Nygren, 2000), as well as moods (Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004; 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999) are related to the decisions an individual makes, past researchers 
have paved the way to investigate the impacts that other characteristics may have on decision 
making. 
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 Interestingly, depression, an issue that affects people on a more global level, has 
received little attention in its effects on the decisions that individuals make. The depression 
literature, specifically the ideas of Aaron Beck, suggests that individuals living with depression 
engage in different kinds of negative thinking. This negative thinking develops into a 
maladaptive attitude, one that in severely depressed individuals interferes with nearly all of their 
thoughts (Beck, 1979). Other notable symptoms of depression include loss of interest in 
activities, insomnia or hypersomnia, feelings of worthlessness or guilt, and lack of 
concentration or indecisiveness (APA, 2000). Because the symptoms of negative thinking, loss 
of interest in activities, guilt, as well as indecisiveness are highly related to decision making, it 
makes sense that when these symptoms present simultaneously, a certain “depressive” pattern 
of decision making may emerge.  
Despite the multitude of research that has been done in the three independent areas 
of a) decision making styles, b) the impact of emotions on decision making, and c) 
depression, few researchers have investigated their interactions. The purpose of our study 
was to do exactly that. In this study, we addressed two highly related questions. First, we 
asked if individuals who score higher on assessments of depressive characteristics are more 
likely than other participants to endorse a regret-based decision making style. Secondly, 
given that there has been in other studies, and was expected in this one as well, a correlation 
between these two measures, we asked how the combination of depressive symptoms and 
the endorsement of the regret-based decision style affected the decisions made by our 
sample. In addition to these questions, we also sought to discover if the induction of a sad-
mood had the same risk-enhancing effects on individuals in our sample as past literature 
suggests it had on “average” participants.  
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   Decision Making Styles 
Prior to launching into an investigation of how mood and depression may interact with 
decision-making style, it is important to grasp what exactly we mean by decision-making style. 
In Nygren’s (2000) work he outlines the development of the three subscales of the Decision-
Making Inventory (DMI). From a larger sample of items, Nygren ran a series of factor analyses 
from which he discovered that three separate types of statements consistently loaded together. 
He noted that these types of statements suggested three different styles of decision making: 
analytical (ANA), intuitive (INT), and regret-based (REG). Each style is now represented by 15 
statements on the 45 item DMI. 
 Recall from the example explained in the opening that the three individuals described 
all used different methods to choose between two jobs; each method describes the basic tenants 
of each of the decision making styles. Analytical Ashley used an information seeking approach 
to compare all the facts surrounding either job. The ANA style has statistically significant 
negative correlations with such personality traits as depression, impulsivity, risk-seeking 
behavior, and causal uncertainty (Nygren & White, 2001). Intuitive Ian went more with his gut 
feelings, picking the job that just felt right to him. The INT style has statistically significant 
positive correlations with need for cognition, faith in intuition, risk-seeking behavior, and 
impulsivity, as well as a significant negative correlation with depression (Nygren & White, 
2001).  Then there was Regret-Based Rita, who made her decision by picking the job that she 
thought she would feel the least bad about. The REG style is statistically significantly correlated 
with harm-avoidance, self-doubt, anxiety, depression and causal uncertainty. The REG style is 
negatively correlated with need for cognition, faith in intuition, risk-seeking behavior, and 
impulsivity (Nygren & White, 2001).Given the correlations between DMI styles and other 
personality factors, endorsement of one DMI style over the others (the styles are not mutually 
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exclusive), highlights the information that a particular individual likely sees as pertinent to the 
decision at hand.  
  The Role of Emotions in Decision Making 
One issue that has been long standing in the research is the impact that an individual’s 
emotional state has on the decisions he makes. Previous studies have found that when an 
individual makes a decision in a particular mood, he may use mood repair strategies to influence 
his emotional state. (Morris & Reilly, 1987; Zillmann,1988). This strategy is most notably 
employed by participants in Forgas’ (1991) study, in which participants in either a sad or neutral 
mood chose a partner for a strategic task based on evidence about the partner’s interpersonal 
skills, and their abilities in the task. Forgas found that participants in the sad mood condition 
were more likely to choose to work with a partner with good interpersonal skills, who was 
described as kind, than they were to choose a partner who would be skilled at the task. From 
this finding he concluded that mood-repair occurs when participants in sad moods have an 
opportunity to improve that mood, in this case by working with a pleasant partner (Forgas, 
1991). 
Following Forgas’ finding on the use of mood repair strategies to escape negative 
moods, researchers Raghunathan and Pham (1999) sought to discover differences in decision 
making displayed by individuals with two distinct negative moods: induced sadness or induced 
anxiety. Their work had a very formative impact on the current research, as we too looked for 
these differences among participants in different mood conditions.  
In the Raghunathan and Pham (1999) study, the researchers first induced undergraduate 
students with either a neutral, anxious, or sad mood, by asking participants to read and relate to 
hypothetical situations (a popular mood manipulation technique). In the first study, after 
undergoing mood manipulation for their target mood (either neutral, sad, or anxious), 
Decision Making, Mood, & Risk 7 
 
participants were asked to rate their preference for either a “high risk/ high reward” gamble 
(where the chances of winning are low but the amount to be won is high) or a “low risk/ low 
reward” gamble (where the chances of winning are high but the amount to be won is low). As 
the authors predicted, the participants in the sad mood condition showed a preference for the 
higher risk/ higher reward gamble. This preference followed the mood repair strategy of finding 
the “missing reward” associated with sadness. Also, as predicted, those in the anxious mood 
showed a preference for the lower risk/ lower reward gamble, perhaps as a means to reduce 
anxiety. They found that participants in the neutral mood had preferences in between these two 
extremes (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) also conducted a second experiment in this study, using 
the same techniques from the first experiment but in a field unrelated to gambling. In Study 2, 
the researchers induced emotion through the same mechanism, but then went on to have 
participants rate their preferences for either a “high risk/ high reward” job opportunity (which 
had low job security but paid very well) or a “low risk/ low reward” job opportunity (which had 
high job security, but did not have nearly as strong of a salary). Again the results showed that 
the participants in the sad mood were most likely to prefer the high risk/ high reward situation, 
while the anxious participants were most likely to prefer the low risk/ low reward situation, and 
the neutral participants once again fell in the middle. 
 A third experiment conducted as part of Raghunathan and Pham’s 1999 study replicated 
Study 1, but had participants make decisions for themselves and another individual. This 
manipulation was used to try to understand the mechanism related to the preference differences 
in sad and anxious individuals. Raghunathan and Pham offered two hypothesizes related to the 
reason for these differences. Either, (1) induced mood simply biased the participants’ decisions 
(which should have resulted in them making the same decisions for themselves and the other) or 
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(2) they took into account their mood and the way that specific outcomes would affect it. 
Importantly, results from this experiment showed that in the self condition preferences for risk 
highly resembled those found in Study 1. However, in the “other” condition, no such 
differences in preferences were found, leading the researchers to believe that participants were 
paying attention to the way different outcomes would impact their mood.  
Overall, Raghunathan and Pham demonstrated that mood can impact decisions. They 
found that individuals in an induced sad mood will be more risk-seeking while those in an 
induced anxious mood will be less risk-seeking. Additionally, they claimed that these risk 
related preferences likely stemmed from a drive to reduce the participants’ own sadness, or 
anxiety, as is suggested by mood repair strategy (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  
In a follow-up study, Raghunathan and Corfman (2004) tested pleasure-seeking, in 
addition to risk-seeking, and found similar results. In this study, participants were again 
randomized into sad, anxious, or neutral mood induction conditions. However, rather than 
having participants choose between low/high, risk/reward scenarios, they were told that they 
would need to complete two tasks in the next two weeks (an enjoyable task and a necessary 
task) and were asked which they would like to complete first. Though the majority of 
participants had an overall preference for the enjoyable task, results showed that those in the 
anxious mood were more likely than those in the sad or neutral moods to choose to do the 
necessary task first (hypothesized to reduce anxiety). On the other hand, those in the sad mood 
were more likely to choose to do the enjoyable task first (hypothesized to reduce sadness). 
These results seem to indicate that when mood is temporary, participants may take action in 
order to alter a negative mood.  
 Impact of Depression and Other Trait Emotions on Risk-Taking 
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Although these studies have shown the way different temporary or state emotions impact 
decisions, participants were unselected and, as such, represent a non-depressed sample.  Do 
these patterns for state-sadness hold true for depression, which as mentioned earlier typically 
lasts for a more extended period of time and is marked by decreased interest in pleasurable 
activities? This question was tackled recently and the findings largely suggest they do not. In 
one study researchers had depressed and control participants complete the Iowa Gambling Task 
(Smoski et al., 2008). 
In the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), participants play a card game to try to win as much 
virtual money as possible. Participants win when they pick “good” cards, and though they do 
not know before starting the game, some decks have more “good” cards than others, and some 
decks have “bad” cards which cause them to lose money. Thus, the game really tests how 
participants react to negative feedback, and in so doing, attempt to maximize the amount of 
virtual money they make. Although it can be said that the IGT is different from the risk-
preference situations tested in other decision-making studies (i.e., Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), 
in that it actually measures decisions based on feedback rather than simple hypothetical 
preferences, the Smoski et al. (2008) study is the most relatable study that specifically looked at 
the impact of depression on decisions. During this study, depressed participants did better than 
controls in terms of their overall score, a result which was interpreted as high sensitivity to 
negative feedback demonstrated by the depressive group. This finding suggests that depression, 
and perhaps the associated mood of chronic sadness, may have a very different impact on 
decision making processes than induced sadness does. 
The finding made by Smoski and colleagues (2008), is in line with those made in an 
earlier study, in which Lerner and Keltner (2001) investigated the impact of other long lasting, 
trait emotions (anger and fear) on decision making. In this study, Lerner and Keltner found that 
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these trait emotions did have an impact on non-related decisions. This impact was seen when 
fearful participants evidenced more risk aversion and angry participants showed more risk-
seeking attitudes. The results of the Lerner and Keltner study however, show relationships 
related to mood repair strategy (Forgas, 1991), whereas the results of the Smoski et al. study did 
not show participants taking more risks to reduce their sadness (though again depression is not 
simply sadness), the way that mood repair strategy seems to suggest they would.  
   The Current Study 
To get a better sense of the combined effects of the previous literature, we revisit the 
example of Ashley, Ian, and Rita. Research on the Decision-Making Styles Inventory shows 
that the majority of people apply  a specific style (ANA, INT, REG) to the decision-making 
process as a whole, and use that style stably across decisions (Nygren, 2000). Thus, while 
Ashley weighs pros and cons, Ian goes with his gut feelings, and Rita seeks to avoid regret. 
Although decision-making style shows us what information individuals weigh most heavily 
when making a decision, it doesn’t say much about the role of mood states. Yet the findings of 
research on the impact of mood in an unselected sample can easily coexist with decision making 
style research. After all, if Ashley were sad at the time she was considering the costs and 
benefits of either job, surely a good analytical question would be “which job is more 
rewarding?” Similarly, if Ian were in an anxious mood, he might have a “better feeling” about 
the job that could reduce his anxiety. Since ANA and INT styles seem to be more widely held 
than REG styles in a general population it’s easy to see how these two theories of decision-
making can be combined. 
 Yet the results of the depression research seem to indicate that individuals with 
depression do not engage in typical mood-repair strategies, showing that depression differs from 
sadness in the way that it may impact decision making. After all, depressed participants were 
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found to take fewer risks in the IGT than their non-depressed counterparts (Smoski et al, 2008), 
even though research on the role of mood suggests that in order to alleviate sadness, participants 
in an induced sad condition take more risks (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). This contradiction 
suggests that people in sad moods make different decisions than those in depressed moods. 
Because prolonged sadness is a symptom of depression, perhaps the decision making process is 
affected by simply the chronicity of mood; where sad people may make higher risk decisions in 
attempts to elevate their mood, but depressed people do not think such tactics will work. 
Another possibility, however, is that in the pattern of differences that puts individuals at risk for 
depression (negative thinking, loss of interest in activities, guilt, as well as indecisiveness), is an 
overriding decision making style that causes these individuals to be more risk averse.  In the 
current study, we related the decision making styles to symptoms of depression as well as 
induced mood, and discovered how these traits came into play in preferences for risk and 
reward in different decision making tasks.  
    Methods 
Participants 
We recruited a total of 240 participants for this correlational study. Participants were 
students participating in the Research Experience Program (REP), which consists of 
introductory psychology students at The Ohio State University. All of our participants were at 
least 18 years of age, and all received partial class credit for their participation.  
Participant Characteristics 
 The average age of our participants was 19 (SD= 2.53, range = 18- 40).  The majority of 
participants in the sample were female (57.1%). We also asked all participants about their 
college major and in our sample 55 different majors were represented, yet the most common 
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response to our question (N= 37) was that students had not yet chosen a major (wrote 
“undecided” or “don’t know”).   
Materials 
CES-D: Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977) 
The CES-D is a self-report scale of depressive symptoms, and was created specifically 
for research purposes (see Appendix A). We used the 20 item CES-D, in which participants are 
to circle the number (0-3) that corresponds with how often in the past week they felt they could 
relate to each statement. Total scores can range from 0-60 where scores of less than 15 indicate 
very low depressive symptoms, and scores above 30 indicate moderate to severe symptoms of 
depression. Previous research has found that a cutoff of ≥16 suggests significant clinical 
symptoms of depression (Pandya et al., 2005). Both the reliability and validity of this scale have 
been demonstrated ( McDowell & Newell, 1996; Radloff, 1977). The CES-D is one of many 
assessment tools used for research on depression and depressive symptoms and information 
solely from this inventory is not enough to diagnose depression. In this study the CES-D was 
only used as a tool to compare groups with differing levels of symptoms. 
DMI: Decision Making Inventory (Nygren, 2000) 
The DMI is a self-report scale that classifies decision making style on three separate 
sub-scales (see Appendix B). The sub-scales are Analytical (ANA, which describes a style of 
seeking out information and comparing alternatives), Intuitive (INT, which describes a style of 
going with “gut-instincts” and using quick heuristics) and Regret-Based (REG, which describes 
a style of seeking to avoid potential regret or feelings of loss). The scales are not mutually 
exclusive; therefore, it is possible for a participant to endorse two or even all three scales 
simultaneously. Both the validity and reliability of this scale have been  substantiated  through 
past studies (cf. Nygren & White, 2001). We used the 45-item version of the DMI, in which 
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participants are asked to rank statements about their decision making processes on a 1(strongly 
disagree) through 6 (strongly agree) Likert-type scale. Higher scores on one of the three 
subscales indicate a particular style of making decisions; high scores on two or all three scales 
indicates a mixed style of decision making.  
Mood Induction Mechanisms (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999) 
In order to induce either a sad or neutral mood in participants, we included in their 
survey packet both a cover story about testing ability to empathize with another person, and a 
five paragraph story about another undergraduate (see Appendix C). We used the same 
mechanism to induce mood that was used in Raghunathan and Pham (1999) as well as 
Raghunathan and Corfman (2004), which was provided to us through personal communication 
with Michel Tuan Pham. The cover story explained that participants should read the short story 
slowly and carefully, while trying to imagine themselves in the story.  
The sadness induction story is written in the second-person and asks the participant to 
imagine himself/herself in a situation where two weeks before finals, he/she receives a call from 
home explaining some bad news about his/her mother. The student goes home immediately to 
find his/her mother very ill in the hospital. While the student is visiting his/her mother with the 
rest of his/her relatives, the mother dies.  
The neutral mood induction story is also written in the second-person, and asks the 
participant to imagine himself/herself in a situation where he/she runs into some old friends, and 
describes a very typical day out with friends. They go to a bar, and then a movie, and nothing 
out of the ordinary happens. Then the student goes home, but before leaving makes plans to 
meet up with his/her old friends again soon. Although it is easy to conceive of this neutral story 
as more positive than neutral, it was used as the “neutral” condition in the previous studies 
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mentioned. Thus in order to compare our findings with those found in the past, we thought it 
best to use the exact same mood induction mechanisms.  
 Both the neutral and sad mood induction stories were pretested by Raghunathan and 
Pham (1999), and proved effective at causing a temporary mood change that did not harm 
participants in anyway. We used these mood induction stories because they have been shown 
both reliable and valid through their employment in other studies (Raghunathan & Corfman, 
2004; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  
Hypothetical Decision Questionnaire 
In addition to these widely used and proven scales and induction mechanism, we also 
employed a new questionnaire that we developed for this study (see Appendix D). The 
questionnaire contains five hypothetical decision making scenarios.   
This questionnaire included the two (gambling and job) situations used in Raghunathan 
and Pham 1999 (provided to us through personal communication with Michel Tuan Pham). It 
also included three situations that we created for this study: a situation involving a choice in 
applying to different undergraduate programs, a traffic decision situation, and a situation about 
choosing whom to ask on a date.  
 In each scenario, participants were presented with two options (one high risk/ high 
reward option and one low risk/ low reward option) and asked to rate their preference on a 1 
(definitely prefer option A) to 6 (definitely prefer option B) scale.   The situations were 
counterbalanced so that in two situations choice A was the low risk/ low reward option, and in 
three situations choice B was the low risk/ low reward option. The situations were also 
randomized into five different orders so that we could test if any order effect existed.  In 
addition to rating their preferences on the 1-6 scale, we also asked participants to make a choice 
between the two options (A or B) given in each situation. While choice between the options 
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served as a discrete measure of risk averse (preference for the low risk/low reward options) or 
risk acceptant (preference for the high risk/high reward options) tendencies, preference on the 
rating scale served as an indication of strength of that tendency. 
As part of the questionnaire, each participant was also asked to make a decision for 
another individual in each scenario, though it was stressed that this decision would not 
personally affect the participant in anyway. This additional question was included in this study, 
as it was in Raghunathan and Pham’s (1999) study, to help us in understanding the mechanism 
that underlies each decision.  
Procedure 
 We recruited participants for this study on the REP website, where students are able to 
choose from a number of different studies. When participants signed up, they were randomly 
assigned to either the neutral or sad mood condition.  
This study was conducted in multiple sessions throughout the Autumn (2010) and 
Winter (2011) quarters.  The experimenter provided each participant with a written copy of the 
verbal script and contact information for all the researchers involved with this study. The 
experimenter also read the verbal script to the participants, and after receiving verbal consent, 
handed out a survey packet, which she asked each participant to fill out. This packet included 
the CES-D, DMI, the cover story and instructions for the “empathy task”, the randomly 
assigned mood induction story, a short empathy inventory (to add credibility to the mood 
induction task), and the 5 randomly ordered hypothetical decision scenarios.  
Upon completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter gave participants a written 
debriefing form, as well as information about depression and campus counseling services. The 
experimenter also thanked participants for their time and asked them to contact the research 
team with any questions they had after leaving the study. 
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Results 
Descriptives 
 Data were considered incomplete and were thrown out if a participant failed to answer 
three or more items on any independent scale. If participants did not answer only one or two 
questions on a scale, the missing data were filled in by calculating an average scale score based 
upon other items of that scale.  Only two participants were found to have incomplete data on 
any of the scales (the CES-D and one of the hypothetical situations), and therefore these 
participant’s data were not used in the analyses of these particular scales.  Thus analyses of the 
CES-D and risk-scores are based on a sample of 239 participants; all other analyses are based 
on a sample of 240 participants.   
In analyzing our data we first explored general descriptive information of the total 
sample on our variables of interest (see Table 1 for complete descriptive information on all 
variables). The distribution of CES-D was, as expected, positively skewed with a mean score of 
12.96 (SD=8.30, range = 0- 42), a median of 12, and a mode of 4.  The distribution of scores on 
the REG scale of the DMI was fairly symmetric with a mean of 61.08 (SD=12.28, range 24-88), 
a median of 61, and a mode of 59.  
A risk aversion score was calculated based upon the total number of risk-averse 
preference choices that participants made across the five hypothetical situations. Thus a score of 
0 indicates that the participant always chose the high risk/ high reward option, and a score of 5 
indicates that the participant always chose the low risk/ low reward option. These scores were 
calculated when the participants were making choices for themselves (Self) and for an unknown 
other (Other). The mean risk-averse score in the Self condition was 2.15 (SD=1.15, range 0-5) 
with a median of 2.00 and a mode of 2. The mean risk-averse score in the Other condition was 
2.96 (SD=1.16, range 0-5) with a median of 3.00 and a mode of 3.  
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In total, 115 of our participants were exposed to the neutral mood induction story, and 
125 were exposed to the sad mood induction story.  
Data Analysis 
We had four main hypotheses in this study. First, based upon past findings (Nygren & 
White, 2001), we predicted that in our sample REG style would be positively correlated with 
CES-D score. To test this hypothesis, we performed a simple bivariate correlation of the two 
scales. A Pearson correlation between participants’ CES-D and REG scores produced a 
correlation of r=.285, which was significant at α= .01 (for a complete list of all correlations see 
Table 2).  
In addition to finding the correlation between CES-D score and REG score, we also 
wanted to see if individuals who endorsed (i.e., scored highest on) the REG scale were more 
likely than those who endorsed the INT or ANA scales to score higher on the CES-D. In order 
to test this related idea, we first divided our participants into groups based on which of the three 
decision making styles they scored highest on (although possible, no participant scored exactly 
the same on any two scales). After doing so, we found that the mean CES-D for those endorsing 
the REG style (n= 63) was 17.17 (SD= 9.33), but was only 10.80 (SD=6.69) for the INT style 
(n=40), and 11.64 (SD= 7.55) for the ANA style (n= 136). In order to test if these differences in 
means were statistically significant, we compared each style to the others through multiple 
independent samples t-tests. In the comparison between the ANA and REG styles, the result of 
the t-test was significant (t(197) = 4.12, p <.001).  The estimate of Cohen’s d was 0.82. In the 
comparison between the INT and REG styles, the result of the t-test was again significant ( 
t(101) = 3.75, p < .001) with a Cohen’s d estimate of 0.75. However, in the comparison between 
the ANA and INT styles, the result of the t-test was not significant ( t(174)= 0.677, p > .10) with 
a Cohen’s d estimate of 0.16. Thus we concluded that participants who endorsed the REG style, 
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had significantly higher scores on the CES-D than those who endorsed either other style, and 
therefore exhibited a greater number of depressive symptoms than other participants (see Figure 
1).  
Because we did find a relationship between CES-D score and REG score, we next tested 
our second hypothesis that depressive symptoms and endorsement of the REG style of the DMI 
would both be predictive of heightened levels of risk aversion in decisions made for the self. 
We based this hypothesis on the findings that depression is associated with risk aversion and 
feelings of regret (Beck 1979; Smoski et. al 2008).  
To test this hypothesis, we regressed number of risk averse preferences on the predictor 
variables of CES-D scores, REG scores, and the interaction of standardized CES-D x REG 
scores (we included all other variables as well in a stepwise fashion). The overall regression was 
not significant nor was either REG score or CES-D score when separated. However, the 
interaction of CES-D score x REG score was found to be a significant predictor, producing a 
correlation of .154 between the variables (r² = .024) and a regression equation slope of .14, (F ( 
1,236) = 5.752, p= 0.017; see Figure 2). Thus we concluded that in our sample the interaction of 
CES-D score and REG score could partially predict risk-aversion for the self.  
In a related hypothesis, we believed that the combination of CES-D and REG scores 
would also be related to higher scores of risk-aversion for an unknown other, given that in the 
depression literature the symptoms relating to risk aversion and regret were described as global, 
affecting all parts of the individual’s life (Beck 1979; Smoski et al. 2008).  
To test this hypothesis, we regressed number of risk averse preferences on the predictor 
variables of CES-D scores, REG scores, and the interaction of standardized CES-D x REG 
scores (we also included all other variables in a stepwise manner). The overall regression was 
not significant nor was REG score, CES-D score, or the interaction of these two.  However, and 
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to our initial surprise, ANA score was found to be the only significant predictor of risk aversion 
on behalf of an unknown other, producing a correlation of 0.169 between the variables (r²= 
.028) and a regression slope of .019, (F (1,237) =6.95, p=.009; see Figure 3). Thus we 
concluded that in our sample ANA score was able to partially predict risk aversion in decisions 
made for others.  
Additionally, we hypothesized that we would find a mood effect, so that those in the sad 
condition would be more risk-seeking than those in the neutral condition, as was found by 
Raghunathan and Pham (1999).  
In order to test this hypothesis we conducted an independent samples t-test. The 
comparison of means did not support our hypothesis, showing no significant difference in risk 
aversion score between the two groups. The mean Self risk-averse score for participants in the 
neutral mood condition was 2.03 (SD= 1.17), and in the sad mood condition it was 2.26 (SD = 
1.13). The results of the independent samples t-test showed this difference to be non-significant 
(t(237) = -1.504, p = .134). The estimate of Cohen’s d was -0.19, indicating that mood condition 
had no significant effect on risk preferences made for the self.  
Lastly we hypothesized, based on the findings that mood effects only impacted decisions 
made for the self in the ways predicted (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), that there would be no 
significant differences between the number of risk averse choices made for the “unknown other” 
in either mood condition. Although based upon the findings stated above we knew that a non-
significant difference in choices made for the other would not affirm Raghunathan and Pham’s 
explanation that participants actually consider the effects that choices will have on themselves 
but not others, we wanted to see if there were significant differences between groups when 
deciding for the other. To test this, we conducted an independent samples t-test.  The mean 
Other risk-averse score for participants in the neutral mood condition was 3.02 (SD= 1.12) and 
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for participants in the sad mood condition it was 2.90 (SD = 1.21). As expected, a t-test 
comparing the groups indicated the difference to be non-significant (t (237) = .758, p > .10). 
The estimate of Cohen’s d was 0.10, indicating that mood condition had no significant effect on 
risk preferences made for an “unknown other”. Figure 4 shows the comparison of mean risk-
averse score in sad and neutral condition when deciding for self and for the unknown other.  
Unexpected Findings 
 Although we had not initially set out to explore the differences in risk-aversion that 
participants express when making choices for themselves as opposed to another individual 
whom they do not know, the strength of these surprise findings warrants their discussion. Since 
the interaction of REG style and CES-D were predictive of risk-aversion in choices made for 
the self but not others, but ANA style was predictive of risk-aversion in choices made for others 
but not the self, we began to wonder if strong endorsement of a particular DMI style was related 
to the way that participants made different choices for themselves and the unknown other.  
 To test this idea, we used McNemar’s test for significance of change to discover if the 
likelihood of individuals switching from risk-averse to risky vs. risky to risk-averse was the 
same when the decision was being made for either the self or an unknown other. We divided 
participants based upon DMI style to see if a pattern existed for all participants or only for those 
endorsing a particular style. Using McNemar’s test, we found a significant general tendency for 
participants to overwhelmingly change their choices from risky for themselves to risk-averse for 
others (p<.001) in the job, school, and traffic situations. These tendencies were shown by 
participants regardless of their DMI style endorsement, yet decreased in strength from ANA to 
REG to INT endorsement.  
 Interestingly, in the gamble scenario these tendencies were reversed. Once again, using 
McNemar’s test we found a significant general tendency for participants to change their 
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choices. But in these situations they switched from risk-averse for themselves to risky for others 
(p = .013). These tendencies were shown by participants regardless of their DMI style 
endorsement (though not at statistically significant levels when divided up into the respective 
three groups). The strength of this tendency decreased in strength from INT to ANA to REG 
endorsement (see Table 3 for complete list of preference changes by situation).  
 Though initially surprising, these data seem to confirm the idea in the literature that 
when participants are making decisions in situations that have a low impact on another 
individual’s life (such as a possible $10 over a probable $5), they are more risky than they 
would be for themselves (Beisswanger, Stone, Happ, & Allgaier 2003; Chakravarty, Harrison, 
Haruvy, & Rutstrom, 2010). However, when participants made decisions that had a greater 
impact on the individual’s life, these differences seemed to disappear in past studies. Our 
finding seems to show that rather than disappear, when deciding about situations that have a 
great impact on another individual’s life, these tendencies are actually reversed and participants 
became more risk-averse for others than they were for themselves.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 Over the course of this study, we found support for two of our hypotheses, as well as 
some intriguing results that we had not anticipated.  
 First of all, the positive correlation between REG score and CES-D score and the higher 
average CES-D score of endorsers of the REG style in this study supported our major 
hypothesis that people with higher levels of depressive symptoms put more weight on the 
factors they might regret when making a decision. This is not surprising given that many of the 
major symptoms of depression relate directly to decision making, including negative thinking, 
loss of interest in activities, guilt, and indecisiveness, as well a heightened response to negative 
feedback (Beck 1979; Smoski et al. 2008). The participants in our study who had higher levels 
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of depressive symptoms were more likely to recall the negative effects that bad decisions have 
and could have on them as captured by their endorsement of the REG scale. Just like Rita in the 
opening example, these participants seemed to focus in on details of decisions that they would 
potentially regret later, and reported a propensity to make decisions based off of that 
information.  
  With that in mind, our second hypothesis tested the idea that participants who endorsed 
the REG style and had high scores on the CES-D would be more risk-averse when making 
decisions for themselves. We found some support for this hypothesis when, through a multiple 
regression, we saw that the positive interaction between CES-D and REG scores was the only 
variable that was able to predict risk-aversion scores. Thus we concluded that, to a degree, 
participants who seek to avoid not only regret but also negative feedback are more likely to 
avoid making risky choices. They likely put more weight on the possible negative outcomes of 
these options, and as such interpret them as not worth the risk.  
 We also hypothesized that Regret score and CES-D score would be predictive of risk 
aversion in decisions made for the unknown other. However, we were surprised to find that the 
only variable that was predictive of risk aversion in this condition was the Analytical score. In 
retrospect, it makes sense that participants who make their decisions through an analytical 
process may have felt that they did not have sufficient information to make a decision for 
someone else and thus defaulted to the “safer” option.  Given that Analytical score was not 
predictive of risk-aversion when participants made decisions for themselves, it seems likely that 
participants considered their personal strengths, weaknesses, and overall situation before 
deciding in which situations they would be more willing to take risks. This idea was expressed 
by one participant who actually wrote in the margin of her survey that she “didn’t know their 
qualifications” when deciding to take the safe option for the unknown other in the school 
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situation. In future work we would like to test this idea by giving differing amounts of 
information about the unknown other, and also asking participants to write in reasons for 
making the decisions that they did.  
 For our final hypothesis, we predicted replication of  Raghunathan and Pham’s (1999) 
findings that participants exposed to the sad five paragraph story made more  high risk/ reward 
choices when deciding for themselves. However, we found no support for this hypothesis. If we 
had been able to replicate, we would have seen that participants in the sad mood condition 
scored significantly lower on the measure of risk aversion when deciding for themselves, but a 
t-test indicated that there was no significant difference between the groups.  
 Additionally, we had anticipated that such a difference would not occur when 
participants were making decisions for the unknown other. Although we did find this to be the 
case, the fact that there was no difference in the self condition means that we were again unable 
to find support for the idea that this happened because people consider the way outcomes will 
impact only their own moods, as was suggested by Raghunathan and Pham (1999).  
 Given that we did not find any significant difference in risk aversion based on mood 
condition, we deem it possible that the mood manipulation did not work in our sample. Because 
previous research has suggested (Raghunathan & Corfman, 2004; Raghunathan & Pham 1999) 
that including a manipulation check often dampens the effect of the mood induction, we chose 
not to include a manipulation check in our study. In future work, we would like to design a 
covert manipulation check so that we are able to measure the effectiveness of the manipulation.  
 Although we had not made any predictions about the likelihood that participants would 
be more risk-averse when deciding for others than for themselves, we did find evidence that, in 
what we would consider riskier situations (job, school, traffic), this pattern occurred. We also 
found that in one of the lower risk situations (date) no such pattern was observed, and in the 
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other (gamble) the pattern was actually reversed. Although the finding that participants 
expressed less risk aversion for others in a low risk situation agrees with previous findings 
(Beisswanger et al.,  2003; Chakravarty et al., 2010), the finding that participants expressed 
greater risk aversion for others in the higher risk situations has not yet been thoroughly explored 
in the literature. In future studies we would like to explore this topic by first getting a pre-rating 
of level of riskiness of different situations, and then having participants decide either for 
themselves or an unknown other.  
 Overall, in this study we had mixed results. Importantly though, we did find that 
participants who endorsed the Regret-Based decision style were more likely to have higher 
levels of depressive symptoms and that the relationship among these two variables was 
predictive of risk aversion. With that in consideration, future studies should test the way that 
learning and using a more analytical or intuitive approach of decision making impacts the level 
of depressive symptoms felt by participants over a period of time. If use of a different approach 
of decision making leads participants to take more risks and gain more rewards, it is possible 
that it could also play a role in symptom reduction. Such a finding has the potential to inform 
treatment, and with that in mind we believe our study is among the first of many small steps 
toward considering the way that human decision making processes might strengthen or reduce 
the impact that mental illness has on quality of life.  
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Figure 4 
Bar Graph of Risk Aversion by Mood 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of all Variables 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CESD-SCORE 239 0 42 12.96 8.297 
ANA(DMI) 240 36 90 68.45 10.568 
INT (DMI) 240 23 87 57.57 10.642 
REG (DMI) 240 24 88 61.08 12.281 
ANA x INT 240 -8.492 3.686 -.20007 1.266248 
ANA x REG 240 -4.608 9.271 .25945 1.194206 
INT x REG 240 -8.350 5.364 -.35786 1.316804 
ANA x CESD 239 -3.632 3.056 -.17716 .976320 
INT x CESD 239 -5.477 4.683 -.17707 1.037095 
REG x CESD 239 -2.690 6.880 .28442 1.082986 
SELF RA SCORE 239 0 5 2.15 1.150 
OTHER RA SCORE 239 0 5 2.96 1.162 
Age 238 18 40 19.42 2.532 
Gender (1= Female) 239 0 1 .57 .496 
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Table 3  
                          Patterns of Risk Preference by Situation Type and DMI Style  
Situation  DMI style 
(Total= sum of 
all styles) 
# p’s both 
risky 
# p’s  
both averse 
# p’s risky 
self/ averse 
other 
#p’s averse 
self/ risky 
other 
McNemar’s p-
value  
Gamble  ANA 13 86 14 24 .143 
Gamble   INT 9 16 4 11 .118 
Gamble  REG 12 32 4 12 .359 
Gamble  TOTAL 34 134 25 47 .013* 
Date  ANA 40 30 36 31 .625 
Date  INT 17 5 9 9 1.00 
Date REG 16 10 16 21 .511 
Date  TOTAL 73 45 61 61 1.00 
Job  ANA 47 39 40 11 .000** 
Job INT 11 16 10 3 .092** 
Job  REG 18 23 18 4 .004** 
Job  TOTAL 76 78 68 18 .000** 
School  ANA 62 13 56 6 .000** 
School  INT 22 3 12 3 .035* 
School  REG 31 11 18 3 .001* 
School TOTAL 115 27 86 12 .000** 
Traffic  ANA 24 58 53 2 .000** 
Traffic  INT 12 9 15 4 .019* 
Traffic  REG 11 22 29 1 .000** 
Traffic  TOTAL 47 89 97 7 .000** 
* p-value is significant at α= .05 
**p-value is significant at α=.01  
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Appendix A 
CES-D 
 
Circle the number for each statement which best describes how often you felt or 
behaved this way – DURING THE PAST WEEK. 
 
 Rarely or 
none of 
the time 
(less than 
1 day) 
Some or a 
little of 
the time 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally or a 
moderate amount 
of the time 
(3-4 days) 
Most or 
all of the 
time 
(5-7 
days) 
1. I was bothered by things 
that usually don’t bother 
me. 
0 1 2 3 
2. I did not feel like eating; 
my appetite was poor. 0 1 2 3 
3. I felt that I could not 
shake off the blues even 
with help from my 
family or friends. 
0 1 2 3 
4. I felt that I was just as 
good as other people. 0 1 2 3 
5. I had trouble keeping 
my mind on what I was 
doing. 
0 1 2 3 
6. I felt depressed. 
0 1 2 3 
7. I felt that everything I 
did was an effort. 0 1 2 3 
8. I felt hopeful about the 
future. 0 1 2 3 
9. I thought my life had 
been a failure 0 1 2 3 
10. I felt fearful. 
0 1 2 3 
11. My sleep was restless. 
0 1 2 3 
12. I was happy. 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
0 1 2 
 
3 
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13. I talked less than usual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. I felt lonely. 
 
Rarely or 
none of 
the time 
(less than 
1 day) 
 
 
0 
Some or a 
little of 
the time 
(1-2 days) 
 
 
 
1 
Occasionally or a 
moderate amount 
of the time 
(3-4 days) 
 
 
 
2 
Most or 
all of the 
time 
(5-7 
days) 
 
 
3 
15. People were 
unfriendly. 0 1 2 3 
16. I enjoyed life. 
0 1 2 3 
17. I had crying spells. 
0 1 2 3 
18. I felt sad. 
0 1 2 3 
19. I felt that people 
disliked me. 0 1 2 3 
20. I could not get going. 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix B 
Decision Making Inventory 16P-55 (REVISED) 
We are interested in how you typically go about making decisions.  Think about different situations and contexts 
where you have made decisions recently.   Then for each statement below, indicate the degree to which you agree 
or disagree with that statement.  Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers to any of these items, 
because there is no single “best” way to make every decision.  It is important that you try to answer all questions.  
However, if you feel uncomfortable with any item, you may choose to omit it.  Use the following rating scale for 
each statement. 
 
1  2  3   4  5  6 
Strongly Moderately Slightly   Slightly  Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
1 ____ I feel that if I plan my decisions carefully I will make good decisions. 
2 ____ In spontaneous decision situations I usually find that I have good intuitions. 
3 ____ I think that I could keep myself from worrying later if I had made a bad decision. 
4 ____ In making decisions I first try to make a mental list of all the factors or attributes that will be important to 
 my decision 
5____ I can get a good “feeling” for most decision situations very quickly. 
6 ____ I sometimes spend too much time hesitating before making decisions. 
7 ____ Before I make a decision, I like to figure out the most efficient way of studying it. 
8 ____ I feel that I have a knack for making good, quick decisions. 
9 ____  I tend to remember bad decisions I’ve made. 
10____ I’m very rational when it comes to evaluating risky options. 
11____ I think that relying on one’s “gut feelings” is a sound decision making principle. 
12 ____   I tend to be someone who worries a lot over decisions I’ve made. 
13____ In making decisions I first make a careful initial estimate of the situation. 
14 ____  A quick, intuitive decision rule usually works best for me. 
15 ____ After making a decision, I find that I often go back and re-evaluate the situation. 
16____ I try to pay attention to past information in making new decisions. 
17____ Sometimes decisions, even important ones, are not difficult to make because they just “feel” right. 
18____ I have trouble putting the results of disappointing decisions I’ve made behind me. 
19____ A good rule of thumb is that the more information I have in making a decision, the better that decision will 
be. 
20 ____ Simple decision rules usually work best for me. 
21____ I rarely rethink old decisions I’ve made. 
22____ In making decisions I try to evaluate the importance of each piece of information in the decision process. 
23____ When forced to make a quick decision, I find that information that readily comes to mind is usually the 
most useful in making a choice. 
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1  2  3   4  5  6 
Strongly Moderately Slightly   Slightly  Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree  Agree  Agree  Agree 
 
24____ Worrying about future decisions that I have to make is something I often do. 
25____ I always try to be fully prepared before I begin working on making a decision. 
26____ My first reaction to a decision situation usually turns out to be the best one. 
27____ Many times when I look back on a choice I’ve made, I wish that I would have put more effort into 
evaluating the alternatives 
28____ In making decisions I try to examine the importance of the good and bad points of each alternative. 
29____ I make my best choices when I have to make quick, instinctive decisions. 
30____ When I find out that I’ve made a bad decision I feel a lot of regret. 
31____ I like to take a rational, systematic approach to making decisions. 
32____ When making decisions, my first instinct usually turns out to be best. 
33____ Before I make a decision, I think about whether I might regret it later. 
34____ My best decisions are those for which I’ve carefully weighed all of the relevant information. 
35____ I let my intuition play a big part in most decisions I make. 
36____ I generally don’t make very good decisions under time pressure. 
37____ I generally rely on careful reasoning in making up my mind. 
38____ I often rely on my first impression when making a decision. 
39____ I sometimes get “butterflies” in my stomach when I have to make decisions. 
40____ I like to make decisions in an orderly manner. 
41____ I rely on my intuition in making many of my personal decisions. 
42____ After making a decision I sometimes worry about the regret I’ll feel if it the outcome turns out to be a bad 
one. 
43____ Most important decisions in life are complex and need to be evaluated in a systematic way. 
44____ I find that my best decisions usually result from using the “quick and easy” approach rather than the 
 “slow but sure” method. 
45____ Unexpected bad outcomes have a greater impact on me than do unexpected good outcomes. 
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Appendix C 
PART II: EMPATHY WITH HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 
 
The purpose of this task is to investigate your ability to put yourself in a hypothetical 
situation and empathize with it.  
 
On the next page, you will read five short passages about an episode that is supposed 
to have happened recently in your life. As you read the passages, try to experience the 
event as vividly as possible by imagining what it would feel like to be in that situation. 
We are interested in assessing how successful you are at empathizing with the 
situation. 
 
In order to fully empathize with a situation, it is important that you don’t get distracted. 
Therefore, we request that you focus completely on the task at hand and refrain from 
talking to or interacting with the person sitting next to you. We also request you to 
avoid making any noise (not even a sigh!) that may disturb others.  
 
Please read the passages slowly and carefully.  
 
We thank you for your co-operation.  
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HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION (NEUTRAL) 
 
1.  I ran into Pat, an old acquaintance of mine, the other day. This happened at the 
mall. To tell you the truth, I did not realize that it was Pat for a long time. It did look 
like the Pat I knew from behind (especially the slouch), but I couldn’t be sure. It was 
only when Pat started walking that I realized it couldn’t be anyone but Pat. Pat had 
this characteristic way of walking without really lifting the legs that was kind of a 
“trademark” Pat walk. 
 
2.  Since Pat and I hadn’t seen each other in a long time, we wanted to catch up on 
each other’s lives and decided to meet at a local bar. I was looking forward to the 
meeting since I wanted to find out what Pat had been up to in all these years. I 
arrived about 10 minutes late and Pat was already there. The bar was very crowded 
and the music was really loud. We could hardly hear each other talk! I decided that I 
would have to do my “catching up” act another time. 
 
3.  We continued sitting in the bar, listening to music for a while. A little later, we ran 
into one of our mutual friends from school - Alex - at the bar. For some odd reason, 
the music also became softer once Alex arrived. Someone must have reduced the 
volume. Alex, Pat and I always used to hang out together and we reminisced about 
the times we spent together. We talked about anything and everything that came to 
our minds, including the TAs and our professors. I was trying to figure out the ways 
in which Pat and Alex had changed and I am sure they were trying to “figure” me 
out as well. 
 
4.  Later, the three of us left the bar to go see a movie and ran into another friend of 
ours from school - Yerah! The four of us talked about how bizarre the whole thing 
was – that we should all meet after such a long time. As it turned out, Yerah was 
with a group of friends who also wanted to see the movie we wanted to see. The 
movie (whose name I forget now) was “so-so”, but had a interesting theme -- it was 
about four friends meeting after a long time.  
 
5.  After the movie, Alex, Pat and I went out for some coffee at the local coffee-shop. 
Alex had an early appointment next day and had to leave shortly. But Pat and I 
continued chatting for a while and then decided to go home and catch some sleep 
since it was getting so late. As we parted, we promised to meet again sometime 
soon.  
 
 
 
Decision Making, Mood, & Risk 41 
 
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION (SAD) 
 
1.  It is nearing the end of the spring semester and you are really looking forward to the 
summer break. The semester has been a little hectic, and you are happy that you 
will have some time relaxing with your family. The Sunday two weeks before finals 
week you get up early to catch up on your courses. You are in the shower thinking 
about what you will study when your roommate pulls you out of the shower, telling 
you you have a phone call from you sibling. The minute you talk to your sister 
(brother) you know by her (his) strained voice that something is wrong. She (he) tell 
you that your mom is sick in the hospital, and that they don’t know what it is. 
Without finding out more you say you’ll fly back there immediately. 
 
2.  The flight home is confusing, and you feel dizzy in trying to come to some 
understanding of what is happening. You constantly reassure yourself that your 
mom is OK and that it is nothing serious. Funnily, it seems as though people on the 
plane sense your distress and act sympathetically toward you. 
 
3.  Upon arrival you quickly take a cab to the hospital and once there you find your 
mom’s room. Upon entering your mom’s room, you see the rest of your family there 
with their pale drained faces and teary eyes. They are huddled around your mom, 
who looks weakened and frail, with yellowed skin. You are overwhelmed by how 
much you love your mom and how pained she looks. 
 
4.  You go to your mom’s bed and kneed beside her, hold her legs. Her face rocks 
semi-consciously, flinching from time to time, and sometimes whimpering at the 
pain in her body. She looks up at you and the rest of the family, seeming to cry and 
smile at the same time. She raises her arms a little under the sheets as if to reach 
out to you and says “you’re all here”. “Of course we are” you reply and then she 
says, somewhat hesitantly, “It is sort of strange being in this place, isn’t it?”  
 
5.  You all reassure her that she’ll be all right, but she closes her eyes and tells you 
that she feels like she is spinning around. She then closes her eyes and dies.  
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 EMPATHY INVENTORY 
 
Please indicate how well you were able to empathize with the hypothetical situation 
you just read: 
 
         Strongly          Strongly 
           Agree          Disagree 
   
I could relate to  
the episode I just read.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I was able to imagine the  
episode very vividly.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I felt myself getting emotional 
as I read the passage.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel the issue the passage  
dealt with was not realistic.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I feel the issue the passage  
dealt with was relevant to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
I would have reacted  
similarly in the same situation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix D 
CONSUMER DECISION MAKING QUESTIONNAIRE 
In this questionnaire, we are interested in testing how people make decisions and 
choices. In the following pages, you will be asked to make some decisions and 
choices. 
 
Please read each of the situations and answer the questions that follow:  
   GAMBLE SITUATION PART A 
 
Supposing you are asked to choose between the following two gambles: 
 
 
  Gamble A      Gamble B 
 
                    6/10 chance               3/10 chance    
     of              of 
                    winning $ 5           winning $10 
 
 
1. Indicate which of these two gambles you feel is more attractive (circle the 
number that best represents your preference): 
 
      I find Gamble A                         I find Gamble B 
       more attractive                                   more attractive        
 
 
   1                 2              3               4           5               6  
 
   GAMBLE SITUATION PART B 
 
2. If you were asked to choose one of them (to play), which one would it be (check 
one)? 
 
 Gamble A  _____ 
 
 Gamble B _____ 
    
   GAMBLE SITUATION PART C 
 
3. Suppose you are then asked to choose between the two gambles for another 
person, and note that the results of the gamble will not personally affect you in anyway. 
You do not know this other person. Which gamble would you choose (check one)? : 
 
 Gamble A  _____ 
 
 Gamble B _____ 
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    JOB SITUATION PART A 
 
Supposing you are asked to choose between the following two job opportunities 
(assume each is a position you would actually seek and are the same type of job but 
with different companies): 
 
 
  Job A         Job B 
Job A is a position in the field in which  
you received your degree. While this 
position offers a salary near the top of the 
expected range, it is with a newly formed 
company and thus can offer only minimal job 
security.   
Job B is a position in the field in which you 
received your degree. While this position 
offers a salary near the bottom of the 
expected range, it is with an established 
company, and thus can offer high job 
security.
 
 
1. Indicate which of these two jobs you feel is more attractive (circle the number that best 
represents your preference): 
 
      I find Job A                         I find Job B 
       more attractive                                   more attractive        
 
 
   1                 2              3               4           5               6  
 
      
     JOB SITUATION PART B 
 
2. If you were asked to choose one of them (to accept), which one would it be (check one)? 
 
 
 Job A  _____ 
 
 Job B _____ 
 
 
 
     JOB SITUATION PART C 
3. Suppose you are then asked to choose between the two jobs for another person, and note 
that the results of the choice will not personally affect you in anyway. You do not know this other 
person. Which job would you choose (check one)?: 
 
 Job  A _____ 
 
 Job B _____ 
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    SCHOOL SITUATION PART A 
 
Supposing you are asked to choose between the following two undergraduate programs 
(assume each is a school to which you have applied and been accepted): 
 
 
  School A         School B 
School A offers the major that you are 
interested in, and has a reputation for 
graduating exceptionally qualified 
professionals who easily get top jobs in your 
field. However, the major program is highly 
competitive, and approximately 30% of 
students who apply to the program are 
accepted into it.  
School B offers the major that you are 
interested in, and has a reputation for 
graduating somewhat qualified 
professionals, who find entry-level positions 
in your field, or a related field. However the 
major program is non-competitive and 100% 
students who apply to the program are 
accepted.
 
 
1. Indicate which of these two schools you feel is more attractive (circle the number that best 
represents your preference): 
 
      I find School A                         I find School B 
       more attractive                                   more attractive        
 
 
   1                 2              3               4           5               6  
 
      
     SCHOOL SITUATION PART B 
 
2. If you were asked to choose one of them (to attend), which one would it be (check one)? 
 
 
 School A  _____ 
 
 School  B _____ 
 
 
 
     SCHOOL SITUATION PART C 
3. Suppose you are then asked to choose between the two schools for another person, and note 
that the results of the choice will not personally affect you in anyway. You do not know this other 
person. Which school would you choose (check one)?: 
 
 School  A _____ 
 
 School B  _____ 
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     TRAFFIC SITUATION PART A 
 
Supposing you are asked to choose between the following actions when approaching a yellow 
light while on your way to an important meeting, for which you are nearly late: 
  
 Action A           Action B 
You can speed up and try to get through the 
light before it changes. Although this 
intersection is sometimes the scene of 
accidents, making it through the light means 
that you will be on time to the meeting. You 
know that being on time is fairly important to 
your boss.  
 
You can slow down and get to the 
intersection at a red light. Although this 
intersection has a long light and slowing 
down guarantees you will be at least three 
minutes late to the meeting, it also means 
there is no chance you will be involved in 
any accident. You know that being on time is 
fairly important to your boss, but think he’ll 
understand. 
 
 
 
1. Indicate which of these two actions you feel is more attractive (circle the number that best 
represents your preference): 
 
      I find Action A                         I find Action B 
       more attractive                                   more attractive        
 
 
   1                 2              3               4           5               6  
 
      
     TRAFFIC SITUATION PART B 
 
2. If you were asked to choose one of them (to take), which one would it be (check one)? 
 
 
 Action A  _____ 
 
 Action  B _____ 
 
 
 
     TRAFFIC SITUATION PART C 
3. Suppose you are then asked to choose between the two actions for another person, and note 
that the results of the choice will not personally affect you in anyway. You do not know this other 
person. Which action would you choose (check one)?: 
 
 Action  A _____ 
 
 Action B  _____ 
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    DATE SITUATION PART A 
Supposing you need to choose between the following two potential dates to a formal dance 
(assume you may only ask one no matter her (his) answer): 
 
 
  Potential Date A         Potential Date B 
You have had many classes with potential 
date A, and would consider her (him) a 
friend. You have heard from other friends of 
hers (his) that she (he) would definitely say 
yes to you if you asked her (him) to the 
dance. However, you wouldn’t like to 
develop a romantic relationship with 
potential date A because although you are 
confident she (he) is attracted to you, you 
don’t feel you have much in common aside 
from classes.  
 
 
You have not had many classes with 
potential date B, and would consider her 
(him) an acquaintance that you would like to 
get to know better. You have heard from 
other friends of hers (his) that some other 
guys (girls) are planning on asking her (him) 
to the dance, and she (he) doesn’t know 
who she’d (he’d) like to go with. You would 
really like to develop a romantic relationship 
with potential date B, because you think you 
have a lot in common, but you can’t tell how 
she (he) feels. 
  
1. Indicate which of these two potential dates you find more attractive (not physically, 
but which you would prefer to ask) (circle the number that best represents your 
preference): 
 
      I find Potential Date A                         I find Potential Date B 
       more attractive                                             more attractive        
 
 
   1                 2              3               4           5               6  
 
      
    DATE SITUATION PART B 
 
2. If you were asked to choose one of them (to ask), which one would it be (check one)? 
 
 Potential Date A  _____ 
 
 Potential Date B _____ 
 
    DATE SITUATION PART C 
 
3. Suppose you are then asked to choose between the two potential dates for another 
person, and note that the results of the choice will not personally affect you in anyway. 
You do not know this other person. Which potential date would you choose (check 
one)?: 
 
 Potential Date A _____ 
 
 Potential Date B _____ 
